ART. II. — *Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Twenty-eighth Congress*, December 3, 1844. Washington: Printed by Gales & Seaton. 1844. pp. 702.

WE would again, at the risk of being read by only a few of those who look over this Journal, solicit the attention of the public to some of the military concerns of the nation. The many-paged document, the title of which is placed at the head of this article, is not likely to be read by any; parts of it will be glanced at by a few. And yet its contents are highly important. They contain much information which should be generally known. And those who submit to the task of rendering that information sufficiently attractive to be noticed may be said to perform a beneficial service to the public. In most cases, samples may be hung out, which will give a tolerable idea of the bales within; and many will cast an eye upon the former who would not think of examining the latter. We will not attempt to answer the often propounded question, whether these public documents could not be made more brief, convenient, and popular, — in other words, more useful. As they now come forth, they are almost wholly useless. They are not generally even laid aside, uncut, for the contingent benefit of future reference; but fall into the receptacles of waste paper, like the newspaper of yesterday. It is half amusing and half deplorable to witness the residuary documents which are found lumbering, for a short time, the rooms of an ex-member of congress. A retired stationer, who has not yet sold off the remnants of his stock, is not in a more littered and encumbered condition.

The document before us has more than seven hundred pages, besides unpaged matter, such as returns, printed out in all their length and breadth. There is much of this with which we have nothing to do. The reports which accompany the report of the secretary of war form, however, more than five hundred and fifty of these pages. But we may deduct from these more than two hundred pages which belong to the Indian department; with these we have no concern; and we may hazard the remark, that the public, in

general, has as little. It may well be asked, why such a mass of unimportant details should be printed each year at the public expense. The "one hundred" reports relating to the Indian department, filling nearly two hundred pages, might as well have remained in the pigeon-holes of the Indian commissioner. They show the manner in which a great variety of small agencies, in every nook and corner of the frontier, have discharged a benevolent trust, and that the Indians — those *quasi* wards of the government — are under a careful guardianship. But if each bureau were to swell its communications to its proper chief after a similar fashion, — were to dilate, or dilute, its matter after this manner, — congressional printers would have as much presswork as they could do, and the public mails more documents than they could carry. If there be no process of distillation at the bureaux, to extract the spirit, leaving the crude matter behind, we might expect a more sharpsighted discrimination in congress, which professes to sift all matters submitted to it. But it is probable that whatever leaves the bureaux passes, like a sealed package, through all its stages of transmission, unread and unseen, until it reaches the printer's hands, where there is no motive to curtail, nor power to do so, even if the motive arose.

We turn over all the pages of this document until we come to the report of the secretary of war. Our war secretaries have latterly had but little time to learn the duties of their station. During the last four or five years, they have shifted as often as the almanac. Occasionally, they have not even outlived the annuals. Under such variable circumstances, experience has not been looked for, being a plant of somewhat slow growth. Fortunately, the welfare of the army does not depend for its stability upon this high functionary. He may go out and come in with each season; he may be as deciduous as the leaves; and yet the military establishment, and the national defence, so far as it relies on that establishment, remain the same. There is a permanency in the command of the army, and in all the subordinate departments connected with its administration, that makes it nearly independent of these fluctuations. We would suggest a change in the present subordination of the military bureaux at Washington. Having been established, we believe, at a time when there was no commander-in-chief

there, nor, indeed, anywhere, they were all placed, of course, in immediate communication with the war department, — that is, in direct communication with the executive. There is a want of symmetry and congruity in this plan. All these departments (excepting, perhaps, the engineer and ordnance departments) should be concentrated under one head. The commander-in-chief is now that head. He is the proper channel from the army to the cabinet, and from the cabinet to the army. Any other arrangement divides and diminishes responsibility, produces awkwardness and embarrassment, and is a departure from military and efficient organization. We do not apprehend that any bureau entertains objections to such a change. There is a routine that seldom deviates; there are regulations which prevail under all circumstances. It is satisfactory to contemplate the well ordered and fixed character of one of our institutions, where the benefits intended to result to the public depend so much, not to say entirely, upon such a character.

The report of the secretary of war, which appears in this document, compares advantageously with many that have preceded it. When a secretary comes into office, and is called upon for a report such as this, before he has had time to become familiar with its details, he may well be at a loss for materials to give it the customary length. In such a case, if he were to make a brief report, and refer to subordinate reports, which are made under all the advantages of long experience, he would probably lose no credit with the public; and he would certainly set an example of brevity, which is much needed in these days, when prolixity is so fashionable. But unfortunately, the importance of these reports is measured like a road or canal; it is the length, and not the area, that is calculated. The immediate predecessor of Mr. Wilkins, in a like strait as to familiarity with his charge, adopted a new, if not clever, expedient to eke out his report, and give it due elongation. The returns of the adjutant-general of the army, which were presented to him in figures, he rendered into plain prose. Many, who were desirous of knowing the position and composition of our various garrisons, were pleased to find all these details put into a shape that gave them entrance into any newspaper. The adjutant-general's returns come in such a shape as excludes them from these ordinary avenues to the public eye.

They have too much length and breadth, too much superficies, to find accommodation anywhere but in such a "Document" as is now before us, which can hardly be said to meet the public eye.

It may be difficult for a secretary, with all the helps of the largest experience, to determine what limits he should impose on himself. He is the lens to collect into one focus the lights thrown in by ten distinct offices or bureaux. If he transmit them without such concentration, he becomes almost a useless medium. A piece of tape, sufficient to stitch the various reports together, would perform the office nearly as well. How much to admit, how much to reject, may be hard to determine. The report before us is most respectable in its character. It is well written, and marked by liberality of opinion throughout. It is not a mere echo. While the secretary indorses all the suggestions of the subordinate bureaux which have his approbation, he hazards several somewhat new suggestions, which were not acted upon by the last Congress, and which it may be well to examine in anticipation of another session. The secretary says,

"Efficiency and military spirit are much improved by keeping troops in mass. Central depots, on healthy sites, whether forts or not, so that they are readily accessible from all points where the service of a regiment might be required, are the best locations for the barracks for troops. In several of the seacoast fortifications, the plan of defence has excluded, as barracks and quarters for the garrison, separate and exposed buildings, but providing instead thereof, and in the body of the rampart, bomb-proof accommodations, designed to avail for the comfort, health, and safety of the troops, as well as for the proper defence of the works, under the circumstances of actual warfare and of sieges. Proper and well designed as the casemates no doubt are for these objects, I have nevertheless formed the opinion, from my limited personal observation, that it is advisable, in time of peace, to afford the assembled troops and the hospitals barrack establishments, on airy and spacious sites, separate from the forts. With this impression upon my mind (an impression which seems to prevail throughout the army), I would be remiss in my duty, did I not express the hope that Congress may authorize and appropriate funds for the erection of barracks at the necessary points on the seaboard, care being taken that by their location and construction they shall not interfere with the proper purpose and action of the fortifications."

The plan here suggested of collecting troops into large bodies has often been formed, and occasionally carried partially into effect. No military man has ever doubted the advantages of such concentrations. There are certain modes of discipline which can never otherwise be introduced. Still, admitting all this, paramount considerations may forbid them. Every captain of a company naturally desires that the men under his command may be brought together, that he may instruct them fully in all their appropriate duties. Every colonel has the same desire with respect to his regiment; and the brigadier-general and the major-general entertain similar ambitious and commendable anxieties about *their* respective commands. The opinions that govern them all are praiseworthy. A division of troops, with all its appurtenances, forms a perfect military body, and can be instructed to the full scope of discipline. Much larger concentrations are made in the older countries, where the character of the government, and the extent of the military establishments, render them unobjectionable and convenient. The question is, Can such concentrations, even in a subordinate degree, be unobjectionable and convenient here?

In the first place, our country is uncommonly large, and our army uncommonly small. We have a very great extent of frontier to guard. Fortifications have been erected, and posts have been established, at suitable distances, along this whole extent. It is intended that these fortifications and posts shall be occupied. The army is kept up for that purpose. In time of peace, it may be said, it is kept up for that purpose alone. If the troops be dispersed among these defences in a proper manner, there is no surplus for the concentrations recommended by the secretary. Then the determination must be, that such concentrations, beyond a very limited degree, cannot properly be made.

What is the consequence of this determination? It may be frankly admitted, that our troops have no chance, under ordinary circumstances, to become acquainted, practically, with the higher evolutions of the line. The brigadier-general and the major-general have no opportunity to exercise themselves in these evolutions. Their duties become, for the time being, supervisory and conservative. A regiment is occasionally embodied; battalions, often; and thus a measure of military proficiency is preserved, which answers

all ordinary demands upon the army, and upon which, in times of action and enlarged operations, the movements and habits of larger bodies can easily and promptly be ingrafted. Segregation is the condition of our small army; and we must make the best of it. The way to do that is, to watch our garrison discipline with a strict eye and a steady hand. Give these component parts all the proficiency of which they are susceptible, and they will be prepared to coalesce at any moment on an emergency. These emergencies are not often so pressing as to allow no time to acquire a conformity with the change. Indian difficulties are generally sudden. But our largest posts are in the Indian vicinity; and, besides, the mode of warfare with such a foe does not call for extraordinary skill in the broad tactics. We need not apprehend any state of things, which is likely to make us feel that our army — disciplined as it may be, and at this moment actually is, though scattered among our numerous posts — is wanting in adaptation to all the purposes of national defence, so far as its numerical force admits.

There were times some years since, when, under the influence of opinions similar to those set forth in the report we are now considering, posts were evacuated, in order that concentrations might be effected for improvement in discipline upon a larger scale. Colonels saw their regiments deteriorating as regiments, and their own importance dwindling away. All was quiet around them, and it seemed to be thought nothing was likely to disturb that quiet. Garrisons here and there were withdrawn, and others were strengthened. These instances occurred upon our interior frontier; and in most of them, an Indian disturbance, accompanied by some bloodshed, much expense, and great damage to the growth of the outer settlements, was the consequence. The evacuation of a post near the savages always leads to misapprehension on their part. They see the usual restraints upon their uneasy disposition diminished, and, without looking beyond their immediate sphere, to see if other restraints, not probably far removed from that sphere, are increased in strength, they feel that their proneness to aggression and plunder, always curbed with difficulty, may be indulged with impunity. It is in vain to reason about this character of the dangers against which we are to guard. We must take them as we find them, and, if sev-

eral small garrisons secure the public tranquillity better than one or two large ones, we must distribute the troops accordingly, even at the sacrifice of many degrees of military proficiency.

When the board of officers, which, a few years since, made a most able report on the national defence, was considering the proportion which certain works, required for the protection of certain straits, would bear to the number of troops necessary to defend the adjacent frontier, it suggested, that, where the immediate object of the works did not call for an extent capable of embracing a large garrison, subsidiary barracks should be built in the neighbourhood. Such an arrangement, under such circumstances, would be obviously proper. We do not apprehend, however, that the secretary alludes to such cases alone. His recommendation is very general; too general, probably, to obtain support. He remarks that the plan seems to have the approbation of the army. The general commanding does not allude to it. The chief engineer proposes, in accordance with what he supposes to be the wish of the government, subsidiary barracks in some instances, as at Governor's Island (New York harbour), and at the Barrancas (Pensacola), stating good reasons in support of the proposition.

Many of our largest works have been constructed with *casemates*, or bomb-proof arched halls within the ramparts. They are contrived a double debt to pay, accommodating guns (each casemate having an embrasure), and also the troops necessary to work them. In cases of bombardment, the garrison is safely lodged under this shelter, and manages the defence with no fear of the shells, that might, and probably would, otherwise drive it out of the works. There is an opinion prevailing among the troops, that these accommodations are not equally well suited to both the above-named purposes; that the guns have greatly the advantage, being impassive under the dampness and closeness of the massive arches that inclose them. At first view, those who occupy these deep and rather dark recesses seem to live a troglodite life. The dense and thick bulk of masonry and earth that is above and on each side of them makes them cool and damp, with little modification from the changes of the atmosphere without. Whether this makes them unhealthy is the question. The troops have generally decided

that it does. The chief engineer says they were constructed for warlike purposes; that they fulfil those purposes; and are also thought to be applicable to the secondary purpose of quartering troops in time of peace. "The experience of other countries," he says, "justifies this expectation"; and that he believes "we have experience of our own in corroboration"; adding, that, "before judgment is entered against the use of casemates in all cases, it might be well to weigh facts rather than opinions; and where the health of the occupants is, as it would be with the greatest propriety, taken as an index, to rely on medical reports and statistics, rather than on mere belief and theory."

The surgeon-general does not notice this subject in his report connected with these documents. In some of his previous reports, however, he expresses himself strongly against the use of casemates, particularly for hospitals. The opinion of this officer, in such a case, is entitled to much consideration. He is the peculiar guardian of the health of the troops. His objection to the use of rooms for the sick which are habitually damp, and which cannot have very free ventilation, should be received without further evidence of its force. The sick have need of something besides the physician. Climates and general positions are beyond control. Troops may necessarily be placed where both are unfavorable to health. But the hospital, in fixed garrisons, is, so far as relates to comparative advantages, the result of choice and design. The remedies there applied should not be counteracted by artificial causes. Sick men should not be placed where well men are likely to become sick. The spear that wounds at one end, though it heal with the other, is almost useless. But in condemning the use of casemates for ordinary quarters for officers and men, evidence of their unfitness should be produced. The records of the hospital bureau must have such evidence, if it exist. A comparative examination could be instituted, which would silence dispute. It is not enough to show that officers and men are occasionally, or are often, sick in casemates, unless it be also shown, that they are not sick in the same degree under other and different shelter within the same post. Troops should not be unnecessarily exposed to unhealthy influences. Humanity, and even sound economy, forbid it. To keep men in good health is a saving, not only of physical strength,

but of money to the treasury. Still, the extensive modifications proposed in some of our largest posts should not be resorted to without a conviction of their necessity. Such conviction cannot be said yet to have been produced. "Opinions only," and not "facts," as the chief engineer says, have thus far decided the question.

The next recommendation of the secretary exhibits rather an odd conjunction; that is, the "substitution of the single iron for the double wooden bedstead, and the erection of buildings for religious worship, and schools, at all the permanent fortifications." The branch of this recommendation which is placed first in order appears to have originated in the benevolent mind of that functionary, as no suggestion of the kind is found in the report either of the quartermaster-general or of the surgeon-general. Such a substitution would undoubtedly contribute to the cleanliness and comfort of the troops. Wooden bunks are unavoidably subjected to a pest that renders them almost intolerable, and any thing but beds of repose. But most readers of the report will ask whether a matter of police like this calls for such a grave recommendation, for the interposition of the President and Congress. If wooden bedsteads may be provided without such high sanctions (as they are so provided every day), it would seem that iron ones might also. The difference of the material can hardly call for such a wide difference in the sanction. We apprehend that either material can be adopted without new authority, without any enlargement of habitually exercised powers; particularly, as the difference in the cost would probably be inconsiderable. The objection may lie against the want of room, as it is assigned under the present regulations. But that allowance can be increased in conformity, if it be found necessary. We hope the improvement may be made. It is not often that a small matter has such a great recommendation.

We now proceed to the second branch of this recommendation, which loses none of its dignity or importance by coming in at the foot of the bedsteads. This subject is urged by the quartermaster-general in his report, which states, that, "since the employment of chaplains has been authorized by law, numerous applications have been made for means of erecting chapels or houses for religious exercises. But as Congress has never authorized any expendi-

ture on account of such buildings, the authority to put them up has in every case been refused. Recently, however, instances have occurred of commanding officers causing buildings to be put up, to be used both as schoolhouses and chapels ; for which purpose, both public materials and public money have been used. The whole proceeding being in direct violation of law, those who have caused this expenditure of money and property must necessarily lose the amount expended, unless Congress relieve them. It would seem reasonable, that, where chaplains are authorized, suitable places should be provided for them to officiate." The quartermaster-general adds, that he has included in his estimate "an item of fifty thousand dollars" to provide these "necessary buildings at the several posts." It does not appear whether this part of the appropriation passed or not. We hope it did pass, and that the posts where chaplains are stationed will hereafter have places for religious worship which will be consistent with the solemnity and importance of the objects in view. At remote posts, far from all hallowed associations and privileges, the beneficial influences of this worship can hardly be overestimated. The class of people, which, in time of peace, furnishes most of our common soldiers, has a downward tendency, and it requires all helps of this kind to preserve them, at such posts, from sinking into a heathenish state of feeling.

The next recommendation introduced in the report of the secretary relates to the few companies of "horse or light field artillery" now belonging to our military establishment. We have four companies which are thus organized, being a part of the four regiments of artillery. They are now stationed at Fort Adams, Newport harbour ; Fort Hamilton, New York harbour ; Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania ; and Fort McHenry, Baltimore harbour. At all these stations they are associated with one or more companies of ordinary artillery. Some two years since, there were two companies of the mounted artillery combined at one post. This arrangement prevented that distribution of them which is deemed best suited to their usefulness and the wants of the public service. Singly, however, the companies, since the last reduction of the army, are too small "for this [light artillery] exercise in full battery." The general commanding the army says, in his report, that the present association

of ordinary companies with the mounted companies is intended to bring, in succession, each company of the four regiments of artillery "through its school of practice with field batteries and horses." The secretary, while he commends the plan of diffusing this kind of instruction through the whole corps, under present circumstances, appears to consider that an enlargement of the mounted companies, so that they shall embrace within themselves sufficient strength for this full practice, is desirable; and he accordingly proposes that their complement shall be restored to the former footing. In case this be done, the practice with horses will doubtless be confined to the light companies. Whether this would meet the approbation of the general commanding, we are not told. It is likely that it would, and that this plan of passing each company through the ordeal of light artillery instruction was the result of necessity, and not of choice. If each soldier of the four regiments could become proficient in all the branches of artillery service, a most desirable degree of perfection would be attained. But this is more desirable than practicable. All profitable instruction must be somewhat exclusive. Too many seeds sown together obstruct each other's growth. That which is acquired by much drilling is preserved only by continued drilling. If each of these mounted companies can be made complete for all the purposes connected with their service, both officers and men remaining, as a general rule, unchanged, the best results will no doubt be attained.

The secretary does not rate too highly the importance of these light artillery companies, nor pay too high a compliment to the expertness which they exhibit. The facility and promptitude with which they manœuvre are wonderful. To an ordinary spectator, it is like legerdemain. We cannot measure the beneficial service they may render the country in an hour of need. They are the lightning as well as the thunder of our small army. But the secretary says they "are injudiciously stationed when in forts, for it is emphatically an arm for the open field service." The truth of the last part of this remark will be fully conceded; and yet it may not follow that the habitual station of these companies should not be *at* or *near* our forts. They are not for any one place, but to be in readiness to move hither and thither as emergencies arise. Their action, most probably,

in time of maritime difficulties, would be, to dash for any threatened point between our regular fortifications, and serve as a *point d'appui* for local and summary defence. They constitute links of a chain, which, although nowhere joined together, stretch out, with magical celerity, wherever menace shows itself. They have nearly all the advantages of continuity, without its magnitude or expense. Those who recollect the war of 1812, when our coast was pierced in many directions by predatory bands, can well suppose the incalculable service a few such companies, stationed as these light artillery companies now are, would have rendered. They would not have saved Stonington, — glorious Stonington ! — but they would have made the event of Stonington so common, as to have been lost in the crowd of similar repulses. At Bladensburg, Commodore Barney's few unwieldy pieces made a most gallant stand ; they made the enemy waver. That wavering might have been converted into a retreat, had a flying battery been in their place.

Following up his remark upon the injudiciousness of the present stations of these companies (probably meaning to except that of Carlisle, which is "interior"), the secretary says their station, "in time of peace, should be in the interior, or in the Western States, where forage and horses are cheap, and where they would probably, also, serve to more advantage as a model for forming spirited uniform volunteer companies," &c. This suggestion strikes us as being singularly mistaken and objectionable. Forage and horses are undoubtedly cheaper in the interior, or in the Western States, than on the seaboard ; but this, of itself, we apprehend, furnishes no sufficient reason for fixing any part of our means of national defence, established for *exterior* protection, and almost for that purpose only, far within and away from the frontiers, merely for the saving of something in the price of forage and horses, and affording a model for militia companies. As for the latter object, it would be utterly futile, as no occasional trainings can make either men or horses expert in the duties of light artillery. Many militia companies, with only such drills as civil occupations admit, become expert at the musket, and ordinary foot movements. Light artillery is made only by constant and undivided application to its appropriate drill, — such application as enlisted soldiers alone can make.

But it is unnecessary to dwell longer on this unadvised suggestion. The proper place for our light artillery companies is in connection with our seaboard defence. They are placed near the forts, because they there find public grounds, and all the public facilities of supply, — most important considerations, and which cannot be overlooked with due regard to convenience and economy. If this be their proper position in time of war, it is their proper position in time of peace. They form a most valuable and essential part of our maritime defence, and are at all times ready to move towards any quarter along the coast, with a rapidity that railroads and steamboats can make like that of a race-horse, whenever the urgency demands such speed. The company at Newport can shoot through New-England like a meteor. This hardly seems exaggerated language, when we take into consideration the helps found on all the great routes. The same may be said of the companies at New York, Carlisle, and Baltimore. They are all like salient bastions, or batteries, connected with the works to which they are attached; not fixed, and commanding only a certain range, but bearing forward their *point blank* to meet the danger afar off. If there be any objection to their present relative position, it is to the comparative proximity of Carlisle and Baltimore. If it were not for the public grounds and barracks at Carlisle, that place might properly be abandoned for some more southern position, as the South is not sufficiently cared for in the present arrangement.

We have dwelt the longer on this part of the secretary's report, because we feared that a suggestion, so pregnant with objections, coming from such a high quarter, might find abettors among those who look more to the savings proposed, than to the preservation of a well ordered system of national defence in all its parts. Besides, it is unsound policy* to

* This allusion to *policy* suggests to us a hint for the army which we think will not be thrown away. It is easily discerned, that the virulence often evinced in the speeches of certain members of Congress against military and naval officers does not arise so much from hostility to means of national defence, whether *personal* or *material*, as to "epaulets," "lace," "bright buttons," &c. There is no objection even to these insignia in their proper place. The most showy uniforms excite no irritation, even in the most splenetic and sensitive, when exhibited within the chain of sentinels, or upon the quarter-deck. It is when they display themselves on the sidewalks, and at the hotels, that they disturb these morbid humors.

place any part of our army in situations not manifestly military and congruous. The parts, so placed, would soon be regarded as superfluous, because apparently unnecessary at improper places. Whenever the shield is thrown on the back, it seems to be an incumbrance, and probably will soon be thrown away. Where these companies are now, they have accommodations for man and horse. Wherever they are, when not in the field, these accommodations are necessary. Were the companies temporarily sent into the interior, or into the Western States, such accommodations would have to be provided, even at the risk of being soon abandoned in case of an emergency. One such miscalculation would overbalance the savings proposed in forage and horses many fold. We cannot hereafter flatter ourselves that war will send forth its heralds of warning, so that each one may have time to buckle on his armor, the careless to rouse themselves, the remote to come up to the danger. Steam-power has made an important revolution in the facility of attack. The cloud does not now show itself in the distant horizon no bigger than a man's hand, — thence slowly rising and expanding, and giving time to gird up one's loins and flee to shelter. The bolt may break forth from the clear heavens. It is, therefore, necessary that our maritime frontier should at all times be in readiness with such means of

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In England, it is said, these insignia are seldom seen except within the strict sphere of duty. John Bull has a jealousy of the sword, and this jealousy is respected. Brother Jonathan has the same jealousy, and it would be politic to respect it in the same manner.

We shall be pardoned for throwing out one more hint. The army is attacked from within as well as from without. It has eruptive disorders, — it may be the "black tongue." The fable of the members of the body quarrelling, and proposing to dispense with each other, is familiar to all. There are instances of such fatuity in the army. The foot would cut off the hand, even the head, and pare off the shoulders. The present organization has existed in substance, though not in form, ever since we were a nation; that is, every thing that is now done has been constantly done, or attempted to be done, only in a different way, or by different hands. Experience of evils has led to divisions in labor, such as mark improvement in all organizations. We now do that well and economically, which was formerly done perfunctorily and with prodigality. Formerly the army was fed by contractors, who made great fortunes by filching from the soldiers their small rations. They now have the full ration, of the best quality, and at a far cheaper rate. The change in the other departments has been equally beneficial both to the army and the public. The army lives, and moves, and has all things done, in order. If the Florida war cost, under the organization of 1840, "forty millions," it would have cost, under such an organization as we had between 1815 and 1821, four hundred millions.

defence as government has provided. The war secretary assumes a perilous responsibility, whenever he throws any of those means *hors de condition*. He cannot add one jot to them; neither must he diminish them one tittle. Any misuse of them, or any thing short of the best use of them, is such a diminution. The forts are under his supervision, and the men are at his disposal. The former are nothing without garrisons; and the latter are nothing, unless connected with the frontier defences.

We now propose to turn our attention to the reports of the chief engineer, and of the colonel of the topographical engineers. They are full of interest, and it is to be regretted that they stand so little chance of being read. They present a minute view of the operations and expenditures of the two corps during the last year. These operations and expenditures were very extensive and important; the former spreading over our whole maritime and interior frontier, and the latter embracing many millions. It is not our intention to look beyond a few parts of the system. The appropriations which have been made annually for some years, for these objects, show that public opinion is sound with respect to the national defence. Some years since, there was ground for much anxiety. Heresies sprang up in high places, which were likely to affect injuriously both that which had been done and that which remained to be done. Apprehensions were entertained that innovations were to unsettle all that had been established, and that tried and long approved systems were to give way to mere experiments. But, happily, Congress did not coincide with this proneness to change. A sluggish spirit for a while prevailed over all these operations; only delaying, however, their progress, not altering their course. There is reason to congratulate the country that no worse effects followed this temporary hallucination of those in authority. If the present system be permitted to prevail until our seaboard be guarded by adequate fortifications, we shall be as invulnerable as other nations are which are similarly guarded. All civilized nations, which have common prudence, guard themselves thus; and, unless we are without that quality, we shall not relax our efforts until we are in the same condition. It is now some years since the chief engineer proposed, that a company of "sappers and miners" should be raised; but it was

not until the last session of Congress, that a bill to that effect passed either house. It then passed the House of Representatives, and would undoubtedly have passed the Senate also, had there been time. We allude to this company only to express our hope that it will be authorized at another session. There has been scarcely a military proposition before Congress, since the suggestion was first made, which has been more strongly recommended by economy and the wants of the service. If any one will take the trouble to look over the reports of the chief engineer on this subject, he will be convinced that our extensive fortifications, costing so many millions, can be properly preserved only by such a company. Ordinary skill can be supplied by the mechanics of the country. But such laborers and mechanics as are formed by degrees in these companies can be found nowhere else in any country but *in* such companies. There is no ordinary calling that teaches such handicraft. It is peculiar, and can be acquired only by engineer teaching.

We would now more particularly ask attention to the lake frontier. Vast interests are growing up there, such as demand the most generous encouragement and careful protection. The public eye has been turned in that direction by much that has been written and said respecting the population and wealth bordering upon those waters. It is now not quite thirty years since there was not a commodious harbour upon either Lake Erie or Michigan. Presqu'ile (Erie), where Perry's fleet was built, was no harbour at all. That fleet had to float into the offing without its armament, taking it in there. Any one of the vessels which were afterwards so gloriously captured from Commodore Barklay would have been sufficient then to have scattered this fleet, in that predicament, to the four winds of the lake. Put-in Bay, where this fleet reposed on its laurels after the victory, is on an island, and of no more use to the main shore as a harbour, than a harbour on Guernsey is to France. Perry's fleet, after its short career of glory, was sunk for preservation, and only now and then a sail spread itself between Buffalo and Detroit. Had this state of destitution continued, — had art refused to assist nature, — those sails would still have remained few and far between. But we did not stop where nature left us. We have now on those

lakes over twenty harbours, built by appropriations made by Congress.

These harbours are all artificial. Thirty years ago, scarcely one of them was habitually open. Sandusky came the nearest to an exception. All of them had sand-bars at their mouths, which rendered them generally accessible only to row-boats. At certain parts of the season, these bars gave way. When the thaw of spring, or when heavy rains, swelled the streams which had their outlets there, the strengthened current made a breach in the bar, which would admit even large vessels, until the next storm restored the impediment. Thus, a vessel might get in to-day, which could not get out to-morrow. And this contested power was not equally divided between the river and the lake. The former had its day only occasionally, as it was only occasionally that freshets gave it the predominance ; while the latter held undisturbed control the major part of the season of navigation. Such a state of things held out little encouragement for commerce. It was not even "fast and loose." The game presented no temptation to enterprise which looked to the water for scope. There was much speculation at the time as to the practicability of opening these river-mouths in a permanent manner. Soon, the population, collecting upon them, and in their neighbourhood, became such as to demand the aid of government. Fortunately, the president of the United States had just visited those waters, and the government was administered at that time upon principles that allowed these improvements to be regarded as of a national character. Mr. Calhoun, then at the head of the war department, had the forecast to perceive the beneficial influences of such improvements afar off. He saw into the future beyond the common ken ; he believed, that, if he could remove these sandy barriers, which put asunder what nature had intended should be joined together, fruitful results would ensue which no man could estimate. He sent up United States engineers, who devised expedients, which gradually curbed the alluvion drifting along the southern shores of Lake Erie, until nearly every river there flowed through an unobstructed channel into the lake, drawing in and sending out a great amount of tonnage, in its thousand shapes, which has all been launched within the last twenty or thirty years, and which may be said to have been brought into

existence by the fostering influence of these harbour improvements. The national wealth which they have thus, as it were, created, renders the cost of these improvements as dust in the balance. Northern Ohio has grown up under them. That part of this great State would otherwise have been merely a remote interior to the river Ohio. These improvements at once gave her a new and better frontier. She was before like a plant which had the sun only on one side. All her growth was towards that side. The other was, as it were, against a dark and ungenial wall. These improvements broke down that wall, and let in an invigorating light on that side also.

Doubts have often been expressed whether this beneficial work should be continued by the general government; even, whether that which has already been done should be preserved. Mr. Calhoun, who, under Mr. Monroe's benignant administration, ushered in this lake prosperity, has hazarded the remark, that the United States should withdraw its sustaining hand, and leave the States bordering on the lakes to keep it up. Such a policy could be justified only on the ground that the improvements are not of a national character. If they were once national, they are still so. It would be difficult to prove, to the satisfaction of any reasonable man, that they have not been national from the first; that they do not continue to be so; that they are not only almost, but altogether, national, with hardly any exception. Cleveland has but a tithe of interest in the accessibility of her harbour. The whole sweep of States, from Louisiana to New York and Massachusetts, has a deep interest in that of Buffalo harbour. The occlusion, either from neglect or any other cause, of that artificial harbour, would be felt like another "Boston Port Bill"; it would agitate the country from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico. The inconvenience and injury would be felt far and wide. New York could only have her share in them. The preservation of it is emphatically a national concern. And the same may be said with respect to most of the other artificial harbours on the lakes. They are not all national in the same degree; but none of them are so little so, as to become local or State concerns. The natural harbours of the seacoast are not objects of more general concern, than the artificial harbours of the lake frontier. It is not their size or

importance that makes them so ; it is their exterior position.

In most intimate connection with this subject, we would point out an improvement to be made on these lake waters by the government, which has been too long postponed. We allude to a channel through the " St. Clair Flats." There was an item in the " lost harbour bill " of some forty thousand dollars for this purpose. The late president could not have " pocketed " a greater injury to the Northwest. We do not see that this subject was introduced this year by the colonel of the topographical engineers in his report ; the item, therefore, must have obtained its place in the bill through the exertions of the Michigan delegation. They would have been exceedingly unmindful of their duty, had they omitted these exertions. Lake St. Clair is known to connect the strait of Detroit with the river St. Clair, forming together the links that connect lakes Erie and Huron. This improvement has attracted less attention than its importance demands, arising from the fact, that, since the commerce of the lakes has become extensive, the level of the waters on those flats has been generally high enough to accommodate the craft floating over them. But there are many persons now on those waters, who can recall two periods, of a year or two each in duration, within the last thirty years, when not a tenth part of that craft could have floated over them. The theory relative to this rise and fall of the lakes was, for many years, that the change was periodical, the water rising for some seven years, and then falling during an equal period. And until 1828, this theory was in accordance with well established facts. Since then, the high level has been maintained, and the theory, as well as the facts on which it was based, has probably been forgotten.

Whether the waters will hereafter maintain their present high level, or subside as they have before subsided, is an unsettled question. There is about as much ground for apprehension as confidence ; and unless that apprehension be removed, a strong necessity exists for a channel through the flats. The very great interests involved require such an improvement. We have seen many statements of the amount of tonnage which passes through these straits. They are probably somewhat conjectural. But not a doubt exists, that millions of property are constantly afloat there ;

and these millions are yearly on the increase. Should the level of these waters subside, as it has often subsided heretofore, and as it may often subside again, nearly all these millions would come to a dead stand at this point; a stand as dead as if a dam had been suddenly stretched across the lake. By unloading in part, or altogether, as was formerly done under similar circumstances, the boats and vessels might, in due time, be got over, and the trip, after much delay, be resumed. It would be difficult to reckon the cost of such hindrances; but there would be no extravagance in the supposition, that the hindrances of one month (and they might outlast a series of months, or even run through a series of years) would defray the expense of the improvement many times over.

This being the case, it behooves all the States concerned (and they are many and strong) to unite in carrying through this appropriation without delay. There is no reason that can be urged against it; and the reasons for it are a legion. The hazards of delay are imminent. We know not what a season may bring forth. Scarcely a season opens, which, when the channel is buoyed out over these flats (and this task has to be performed at each opening of the navigation), does not threaten to cut off this great communication between the upper and the lower lakes, and cause a fearful looking forward to the embarrassments of the future. It is then that a painful regret is felt that something energetic has not been done to remove this annual cause of deep inquietude.

Some three years since, the topographical department set some of its officers on a hydrographic survey of these straits. A perfect system of surveys and soundings, from lake Erie to lake St. Clair, and of the flats at the head of the latter lake, was completed at the end of the second season. We shall have occasion to allude to these soundings in reference to the mouth of the Detroit river. The flats alluded to stretch, like an outspread fan, from the Canada side of the lake to the Michigan shore. A chart has been made of them, which exhibits all their features, together with the channels that come down to them from the river St. Clair. These channels are three in number; the "north channel," the "middle channel," and the "south channel." The boundary line of the country runs through

the last channel; and a line drawn through this channel from Detroit to the foot of Lake Huron is but slightly deflected at any one point. The same wind would carry a sail vessel the whole length of it. It is not necessary to be a navigator to see the advantages of such a direct course. The middle channel is of a subordinate character. The north channel is called the ship channel, because all the large vessels and steamboats are obliged to take it. In following this, the route to the waters above forms a very deep curve, almost representing an ox-bow, the south channel uniting the two ends of the curve. While, as we have remarked, the same wind would take a vessel through the south channel from Detroit to Lake Huron, many changes are required to get through the north channel. Before steam came into use, the impediments crowded within the few miles of this deep curve were regarded as more formidable than those of all the residue of the voyage. Vessels, which had overcome them under favoring changes, often performed their voyages, and, on their return, found others, which had been close in their wake at the entrance of this channel, but which had been less favored by the caprices of the winds, still at anchor there. This north channel, besides these embarrassments, has more than twice the length of the south channel.

Such are the relative positions and courses of these channels. The chart which is before us represents, with great accuracy and particularity, the soundings of each, as they were found in the autumn of 1842, when the waters were at their usually high stage. According to this chart, no craft, drawing over three feet, can pass over the flats at the mouth of the middle channel. No craft, drawing over six feet, can pass, in like manner, into the south channel. After the flats are passed, there is ample depth for any craft in both cases. The minimum depth over the flats of the north channel is about nine feet. This makes close rubbing for all the large craft afloat. But there is at present no alternative; though there is not a large steamboat that now goes through this channel which does not leave a muddy wake for several miles behind.

The width of these flats at these three points is the next question, and the most important one in its bearing upon an improvement in the navigation there. This width at the mouth of the north channel is about five miles. Through

this distance there has been found, during the last ten years, a somewhat devious channel, whose minimum depth is about nine feet, and whose breadth varies from a few yards to a quarter of a mile. To render the traverse of the flats at this point safe and effectual, a commodious channel must be excavated and protected. The excavations would not be required to be continuous; there appear to be many places within the five miles where that labor could be dispensed with; but the protection of the channel, such a protection as would keep it open, would be indispensable the whole distance. No estimate, we believe, has been made of the probable cost of the requisite improvement at this point. It needs, however, little reflection upon the premises to lead one to the conclusion, that it would be comparatively very great. The width of the flats at the mouth of the middle channel is about a mile; that is, from ten feet depth of water below to the same depth above. An excavation of this length would connect waters of sufficient depth for any craft going into the upper lakes. If it were not for a channel still more eligible as to the length of excavation, as well as in all other respects, an improvement here would recommend itself very strongly in comparison with the north channel. It is true, that it joins that channel two or three miles before it enters the straight course of the St. Clair river. This renders it objectionable for sail vessels, though not in the same degree as the north channel.

We now come to the south channel, that channel which we have before described as having unrivalled advantages as to directness of course, in connection with the waters above and below. It was from the first considered by all who had any familiarity with these waters, that *this* channel ought to be that which should be improved, provided the expense were not inordinate in comparison with others. According to the chart which is now before us, the width of the flat at the mouth of this channel is rather more than half a mile; that is, from eleven feet depth of water in lake St. Clair, to the same depth in the channel above. This simple statement is sufficient to determine its superior eligibility. Here, then, should the improvement be made. This chart presents to view the whole of the flats, as well as the channels, and it requires little more than a glance to lead every one to this

conclusion. The length of the excavation will be the shortest, and the quantity of earth to be removed the least.

The cost of this improvement is supposed, by the words of the appropriation which passed both houses the last session of Congress, to be forty thousand dollars. If it were likely to cost twice or thrice that sum, it ought to be made. But the probability is, that it will not cost even that amount. No plan for the improvement has yet been distinctly proposed. There are but two which will probably be set forth for adoption. One is, to lay down a line of cribs on each side of the channel designed to be excavated, and then to excavate the channel itself. For the sum introduced into the appropriation bill, this, no doubt, was the plan in view. It is a plan that would be effectual, and exclude all doubts as to the fulfilment of the purpose intended. No objections can be urged against it, even on the score of expense. There is, however, another plan that has been suggested by a competent judge ; which is, to omit the cribs altogether, and merely excavate a very broad channel through the distance required. The ground where the digging is to be made consists of sand and clay, which have considerable tenacity. This ground has been proved, as the chart states, to the required depth. It is probable that a channel of liberal width and depth would maintain its dimensions, even without any exterior guards. The only cause that would act against this permanency of character would be the westerly winds, sending back upon the flats the alluvion afloat in lake St. Clair. Even supposing this cause to have some considerable force and activity, we may rely on the increased strength of current, which the excavation would naturally produce, to render it neutral. There is much reason for believing that an improvement of the comparatively simple character here brought forward would be sufficient, and that the cost of it would not much exceed one half of the amount named in the appropriation which has been referred to.

We may have appeared to give undue importance to this improvement. It has been the subject of little discussion ; no importunity has urged it into public notice ; and even those most concerned have hardly introduced the proposition in or out of Congress. While the canal around the rapids of St. Mary called forth much zeal and exertion, a channel through the St. Clair flats has excited little of either. That

canal is undoubtedly worthy of all the efforts that have been made in its behalf. It will throw down the middle wall which now separates two inland seas, and make them one. It will be undoing, with our most simple implements, the stupendous work of Michabou, who, according to the Indian tradition, when Groscap and Point Iroquois of lake Superior were rent asunder, and he saw his watery dominions about to be drained off, cast, with Titan hands, huge rocks into the straits, and stayed the outpouring of the waste by heaping up the present barrier there. But the immediate necessity for this canal, compared with the channel through the St. Clair flats, is small. The one is to open a new region, whose riches will be all the more speedily developed by such facile means of reaching the mines where they are hid. On the other depends the welfare of an extensive commerce, already full of life and fruitfulness, but liable at any moment, through the influence of causes that have often been in operation, and which may often again be in operation, to be brought to a ruinous stand in the midst of a prosperous career. The apathy that has marked the conduct of those who know the extent of this commerce, and also the dangers which threaten it, is as surprising as unaccountable ; or it can be accounted for only by the supposition, that all fear of a revival of those causes has subsided. Such a supposition is without just grounds, and, if it lead to continued neglect of this most necessary improvement of the lake navigation, it may end in a punishment as signal as disastrous.

While on this subject, it is proper to allude to another improvement in those waters, which one of the respectable senators from Michigan, at too late an hour of the session, strove unavailingly to introduce into the appropriation bill. It is well known, that, when the boundary line was run through the Detroit river, its course at the mouth threw the customary channel entirely within the British jurisdiction. This was an unavoidable arrangement. It has since been constantly hoped, that another channel, sufficiently practicable for an emergency, would be discovered within our own jurisdiction. No surveys, however, were made with a view to determine this desirable fact, until within a few years. General Macomb, nearly thirty years ago, had an imperfect examination made, which led to the hope here alluded to. When the surveys of the Detroit river, in 1840, were di-

rected to be made, all the channels which form the outlet of the river were sounded, and an exact chart was made of the same, showing the width, course, and depth of each. By this chart it appears, that there is a channel, immediately under our own shore, which has sufficient depth ; but it is too narrow and tortuous at one or two points for convenient use. It was urged, that an appropriation should be made to render this channel available for all ordinary purposes. The bare statement, that the other channel passes between two shores which are only a few hundred yards apart, both of which are owned by the British, ought to have been sufficient to demonstrate the necessity of the improvement. While the two nations are at amity, vessels will suit their convenience as to the channels, and pass under the British guns without fear or molestation. But this should not be the only safe course open to them. There should be an alternative. We should have a channel of our own, if it be practicable to obtain one. These soundings show that it *is* practicable ; and we should not wait until the moment of necessity arrives, which might be too late, before we clear it out. Should the British portal at any time be suddenly closed upon our boats and vessels, and they be crowded into the other channel until a new way could be prepared, we should be laughed at for our stupidity and want of forecast. The primary cause of Hull's disaster was the necessity of sending the vessel, which was carrying his baggage, sick, and letters, from the Maumee to Detroit, through this British channel, instead of the one under our own shore. It went into the jaws of the enemy, and, of course, was devoured. A few thousand dollars would effect this improvement, and avert similar disasters. The amount called for appears to make it a small concern, but it is a national concern, and the national character and dignity require that it should not be neglected. Take but the crumbs that fall from the snag appropriation of the Ohio, and the raft appropriation of the Red River, — appropriations so important to the national prosperity, but so unimportant in their immediate influences upon the national honor and national defence, — and this new channel will be laid open. No Elsineur will then, in courteous forbearance, watch over the sound of our inland Baltic, until the horn of provocation or temptation sounds, satisfied with being potentially the master of nearly all our outgoings and incomings there.

The defence of these upper lakes has, of late, elicited considerable discussion. Canada, by the liberal aid of the parent government, has been greatly facilitating the means of water communication between her several parts. The St. Lawrence, though presenting to the eye on the map a broad stream, and really having a vast volume of water flowing between its banks, was, until within a few years, almost useless for general purposes of navigation. The many rapids and *chutes* which interrupt its course render it difficult and even dangerous to the smallest craft. General Amherst's disaster was upon a large scale only what has happened upon a small one every year, or month, since the wreck of his flotilla. Lake Ontario was little more connected with the navigation below Montreal than it was with lake Erie above the Falls of Niagara. Such was the case in the war of 1812. But Britain profits by experience. The lessons of the past are not thrown away upon her. Soon after that war, she began a system of canalling, stretching from the tide-water to the lakes, which is intended to bring the ocean and those lakes virtually upon a level. This system has now made great progress towards a completion, and the result will be nearly the same as if the ocean were really elevated, or the lakes depressed, so as to effect this accommodation of level. Under this system it is apprehended that Great Britain, in the event of another war, instead of being obliged to construct a fleet upon Lake Ontario, as was the case during the last war, to be left there at its termination to rot in useless idleness, will be able to detach from her great maritime force on the ocean such vessels as may be required, to mount up into that lake, there to do her bidding, and then to descend again to their larger and more appropriate sphere when that bidding shall have been done. Nor is the scope of these facilities to end with that lake. The Welland canal, which now accommodates all ordinary craft, is, it is said, to be fitted for the passage of war-steamers, so that while we, like the eels, which make constant attempts to climb the great wall of the Niagara Falls, find our upward progress constantly arrested by that formidable obstacle, our neighbours will soon easily send their craft, both of war and peace, step by step, up the dividing grounds, and place themselves, in much of their strength, on a level with all the rich ports which extend from Buffalo to Chicago.

To counteract the effects of these lofty strides over all impediments, apparently reaching our inmost shores with the same facility as our maritime frontier, it has been proposed to make the Illinois canal, which is to connect the Mississippi with the lakes, a national work, and fitted to allow a free passage for such public steamers as may be collected at the Memphis navy-yard. Such a facility, it is urged, would place us, at one end of these interior seas, on the same footing as the British are, or will soon be, at the other. There is much in this proposition that is worthy of attention. Such an improvement would be strictly a national one, though made through the heart of a State. Hurlgate is embraced by New York; and so are many thoroughfares embraced by other States, on which millions of the national money have been expended. It is not because the Ohio and the Mississippi pass *between* States, that they have been considered proper objects of such expenditures. They are the great avenues of the nation, and must be kept open, not to benefit the States lying on their banks, but to benefit all the States. These contiguous States would not, and could not, keep them open. The nation alone can do it. The case of the Illinois canal is not so strong. The State of Illinois will open it herself, as soon as she is able. When that ability will be gained is the question. If it be likely to arrive too late for the national safety, then the general government ought to take the work in hand. This avenue is already, with all its present lets and hindrances, a great national thoroughfare; all those who pass through are not inhabitants of Illinois. They are a multitude of human beings, nearly all parts of the country contributing to swell their number.

Considered in respect to our national defence, this improvement presents itself in a strong light. With an avenue at that end of the chain of waters, which would admit upon the lakes war-steamers from the Mississippi below, no emergency would seem likely to take us unprepared in that quarter. We should appear to be upon an equal footing with the British in respect to facilities of reinforcing the force on the lakes from that on the tide-waters. And that very equality might remove the temptation on the part of the British, in any hostile emergency, to attempt to throw up from the ocean any part of her maritime force. In the war

of 1812, it was a contest between the ship-carpenters of Sacket's Harbour and of Kingston, and the war of construction was carried on nearly *pari passu*. If the contest hereafter were to be, who should introduce the greatest number of war-steamers upon the lakes, it might end in the same manner, or the race might be to the swift. But, even in that case, if the British have the advantage as to the number of these war-steamers, the United States has thousands of steamboats at hand, which, though now mere Quakers, would come out knight-clad at a moment's warning. We could in that way match them two to one, or ten to one, if it were necessary.

This speculation proceeds upon the supposition that government will deem it expedient to interlock, by a navigable canal, Lake Michigan with the Mississippi. But we do not believe it will do this ; though it might not prove half so expensive a job as the clearing out the Red River raft, which, like a thrifty tree, seems to have grown only the more for the trimming it annually receives. But even if the lakes are left as they are, and the British do all they propose to do, we do not despair. There are now hundreds of steamboats on the upper lakes, as above remarked, which could easily be made to play a formidable part in the work of attack or defence. It has been said that we have no artillery on those waters. This is not true. There is a public arsenal near Detroit, which has its stores of this kind, and each military post has spare ordnance. This, we admit, is not enough ; but we could soon have enough, and to spare. It is not at this time as it was in 1812 and 1813, when every gun that reached the lakes became worth its weight in much more precious metal than that of which it was made. Supplies then almost burrowed their way to the frontiers ; now, they take wings unto themselves, and fly to their destination. We should in these days hardly call upon Aladdin, even if we knew he would come. The horse, which now draws with ease his many tons along the canal, could then scarcely carry his own provender ; and wheels now revolve as great a distance in one hour over iron rails, as they could then in one day over *corduroy* roads, or even over turnpikes. New York was then a broad State ; she is now contracted to a span. Both Watervliet and Pittsburg are now, as it were, in the neighbourhood of Lake Erie. Their munition and their ammunition, if called for to-day, could be there on the

morrow. In a week's time, they could arm every steamboat on that lake to the teeth.

But, though there may be a doubt whether Congress will open the way for succour from the Mississippi to the lakes, there ought to be none as to its providing proper land defences upon the Detroit, the St. Clair, and the St. Mary's frontier. A fort is at length going up on the first, occupying the most commanding position on the Detroit strait. But Fort Gratiot, at the outlet of Lake Huron, one of the cardinal points of defence on that frontier, is still nothing but a stockade work; such a work as suited well the times when it was erected, when the Indian rifle and tomahawk alone were to be resisted. In these times, it is little better than mere frost-work. A proper fort — such a fort as has been sometime recommended by the engineers — should be commenced there without delay. Another stockade work — now almost in ruins — is on the straits of St. Mary, another cardinal point of defence. Such stockade works are not even scare-crows in these days, and only give an air of ridicule to those parts of our defensive arrangements. We are there like a swordsman on his guard with only a broken foil in his hand.

We should not be misled by the long peace which the civilized world has now enjoyed, and deem even ordinary precautions unnecessary. We are not reposing under our vine and fig-tree, with nobody to hurt or make us afraid. There is much to hurt us, though little, perhaps, to make us afraid. Nations appear to have become impatient of repose. A new generation has arisen, which bears none of the scars of past wounds, and sees in the dragon's teeth which are springing up on every side only a coming harvest of glory. This feeling has more of the Marcellus than the Fabius in it; is better fitted to give spirit to actual war, than to preserve the blessings of peace. But whether we have war or peace, preparation for defence is a bounden duty, as well as a dictate of common prudence. It is true, that reason and justice have great influence over international affairs now-a-days. A nation would blush, at the present enlightened era, to go to war without seeming to have both in favor of its cause; and as long as honorable negotiation can continue, the evil day is put off. Still, if it be inevitable, its coming is hastened or retarded by the condition, whether unpre-

pared or prepared for defence, in which a nation is found. The chances of success in negotiation are diminished or increased in proportion as that condition sways one way or the other. The best reasons of the lamb had no weight with the wolf. We hope that a nation is trebly armed whose quarrel 's just ; but it would be madness to rely on the armor of justice alone. The king of Israel, who was assured by Heaven that victory would be on his side in the coming battle, still sent forward his picked men to the front of the fight.

ART. III. — *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive ; being a connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation.* By JOHN STUART MILL. London : J. W. Parker. 1843. 2 vols. pp. 1204.

WE quietly take to ourselves some merit for calling attention to these volumes, since we suppose not one in a hundred of our readers has, or can be induced to have, the slightest interest in the subject of which they treat. So much the worse for them, since they are thus led to forego a means of improvement, which, if they knew enough of the subject to be aware of their own ignorance respecting it, they would most earnestly covet. And so much the worse for us is this want of interest in the subject, since it is rather a poor sort of inspiration with which to enter on this self-inflicted duty, to know that it will be equally operose and unavailing. We are well aware that the very term Logic has become a " hissing and a by-word," even among tolerably well informed men ; and if we had nothing more to present on the subject, than a repetition of the skeleton formulæ which have hitherto figured as principles in this science, we too should deem our proposed labor worse than worthless. It would require something more than the miraculous touch of a prophet, to vivify such dry bones as these. But the work before us has nothing in common with these dead and buried things, but the name. And we wish it had not even this, since it may drive away from a valua-